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The Liability of Accountants
*
By Roger S. Baldwin

The accounting profession has recently been much in the public
eye, not only in this country but abroad. The growing impor
tance of accounting is being constantly demonstrated by the
weight which is being attached to the reports of accountants and
the criticism which is leveled against such reports.
Two questions are being asked: What does the accountancy
profession owe to those who employ them and to the public, and
what is the liability of the accountancy profession in the per
formance of its duties? These two questions are in substance one.
The question of the liability of accountants has recently been
emphasized by the litigation in the state of New York which
culminated in the decision of the court of appeals of that state in
what is popularly known as the Ultramares case.
In view of this it would seem that a consideration of that case
at this time might not only be proper but also profitable, in order
to determine what practical lessons may be learned from it.
When the Ultramares case reached the court of appeals of the
state of New York it involved two questions, one of fraud and one
of negligence.
On the question of fraud, the trial judge had decided that there
was not sufficient evidence for submission to the jury (Ultra
mares Corporation v. Touche, Opinion by Mr. Justice Walsh, N. Y.
supreme court, trial term (1929), unreported). In this deci
sion the five judges of the appellate division of the first depart
ment of the supreme court of the state of New York concurred
(Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 229 app. div. 581, N. Y.
1930).
On the question of negligence the jury had rendered a verdict
against the defendants but the trial judge, after further considera
tion, had decided that the defendants were not liable as a matter
of law and had set aside the verdict. On this point the appellate
division disagreed, three judges voting that the defendants were
liable for negligence, reinstating the verdict of the jury in favor of
the plaintiff, and two judges voting that the defendants, as a
matter of law, were not liable for negligence. On the question of
*Address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September 16, 1931.
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negligence, therefore, the vote of all the judges who had passed
on the question was even, three to three.
This score of the votes of the judges passing upon the liability
of the defendant for negligence represented pretty well the uncer
tainty of the question involved and the uncertainty as to its deci
sion by the court of appeals (Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255
N. Y. 170, 1931). The problem, as it presented itself to counsel,
was first to demonstrate that the court of appeals was free to
decide this question on the merits without feeling bound to hold
the defendants liable for negligence because of prior authority or
decisions; and then to demonstrate on the ground of expediency,
if not of authority, that the defendants as a matter of law should
not be held liable for negligence.
The questions of contributory negligence and proximate cause
became incidental as the case was developed and were not neces
sarily involved in the decision of the court of appeals. Without
doubt, however, contributory negligence and proximate cause
were considered by the jury, in accordance with the instructions
of the trial court when the case was submitted to them. This was
before it had been held by the trial court that the question of
negligence should not have been submitted to the jury because of
lack of privity of contract or direct relationship.
The Question

of

Negligence

Few cases in the United States had been found where liability
was sought to be imposed upon accountants for negligence and in
only one of them did the doctrine requiring privity of contract
arise. In that one case such doctrine was expressly affirmed
(Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406; 8 A.L.R. 461, 1919).
Four cases in New York, which involved negligence without
privity of contract and where the defendants had been found
liable, had been cited in the Ultramares litigation in the lower
courts. These four cases, it was claimed by the plaintiff, showed
the trend of general opinion in New York to be away from the
English view on this branch of jurisprudence and towards a more
liberal interpretation of liability in negligence for acts and words
involving third persons or strangers to the contract.
The Buick case (MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y.
382, 1916) was one where the owner of an automobile recovered
damages from the manufacturer for personal injuries received by
the owner because of an accident due to a defect in a wheel which
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the manufacturer had not itself made but had incorporated in
its product. The rule of liability there applied held a person
responsible even to strangers for negligence of a character which
puts human life in imminent danger, such as a false labeling of
poison, a defect in a circular saw, a defect in a steam boiler, the
faulty erection of a scaffold, the defective manufacture of a coffee
urn, the destruction of a defective building, the furnishing of a de
fective rope with knowledge of the purpose for which the rope
was to be used. All of these cases involved a danger of injury
to the person and are known as cases involving the doctrine of
dangerous instrumentalities.
Referring to this case, Chief Judge Cardozo, who wrote the
opinion of the court of appeals in the Ultramares case, said:
“ . . . what is released or set in motion is a physical force.
We are now asked to say that a like liability attaches to the cir
culation of a thought or a release of the explosive power resident in
words (p. 181).”
The doctrine involved in the Buick case had never been
applied by the court of appeals of the state of New York to cases
involving injuries to property (P. G. Poultry Farm v. Newtown
B.-P. Mfg. Co., 248 N. Y. 293, 1928).
The Glanzer v. Shepard case (Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236,
1922) was one where the plaintiff, a buyer of beans, sought
damages against a public weigher who, at the request of the
seller, had certified as to the weight of the beans and had fur
nished the plaintiff with a copy of his certificate which was
addressed to the plaintiff. The weigher had been employed by
the seller of the beans. The weigher was held liable, but to only
one purchaser, namely the plaintiff, who was known to him, as
was also the value of the beans. Furthermore, the weigher
certified to what was, in the last analysis, a demonstrable fact,
not open to dispute and involving no exercise of judgment.
The Erie Railroad case (International Products Co. v. Erie R.R.,
244 N. Y. 331,1927) was one where a railroad company had given
wrong information to the plaintiff as to the location of goods by
reason of which the plaintiff did not recover its insurance on
goods which were destroyed by fire.
The Phoenix National Bank case (Doyle v. Chatham & Phoenix
Nat. Bank, 253 N. Y. 369, 1930) was one where the owner of
certain bonds brought action against a bank, which was acting
as trustee for bondholders under an indenture of trust, on the
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ground that the bank had issued its certificate upon which he, as
a prospective bondholder, had relied. Such certificate was to the
effect that the bank held a certain type of collateral as security
for the bonds owned by the plaintiff, when in fact the bank did
not hold such security. There was involved merely a statement
of fact, easily ascertainable, subject to no judgment or opinion
and without qualification. More than that, an error in the cer
tificate made the bank liable only to such persons as might own
the bonds, and the limit of the liability would be the amount of
the bonds or their value.
It was urged, therefore, by counsel for the American Institute
of Accountants, appearing as amicus curiae, that the court of
appeals of the state of New York, in its trend away from the
English and the earlier American rule that there could be no
liability in negligence where there was no privity of contract, was
not committed to the position of holding that an action for
negligence could be upheld, where no direct relationship existed,
in cases affecting only property rights and based upon words.
Not being so committed, the court was urged to decide upon the
grounds of equity and expediency, if not upon authority, that in
such cases there could be no liability.
On the positive side of the question, three cases were cited in
which liability had not been imposed owing to lack of privity of
contract.
The Courteen Seed case (Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong &
S. B. Co. 245 N. Y. 377, 1927) was one where the court of appeals
had held that the defendant bank owed no duty of diligence to the
plaintiff in connection with a cable sent by a branch of the de
fendant bank to another bank, which in turn delivered it to the
plaintiff. The cable was incorrect as to the liability of the plain
tiff with respect to a certain draft, and the plaintiff, relying upon
the cable, accepted certain merchandise which it otherwise would
have rejected. There the necessity of direct relationship was
expressly recognized, the cable in question not having been
delivered by the defendant bank to the plaintiff.
The Jaillet case (Jaillet v. Cashman, 115 Misc. 383, affirmed 202
app. div. 805; 235 N. Y. 511, 1923) was one where a ticker service
gave wrong information over the tape, which was seen by the
plaintiff in his broker’s office. In that case the court had held
that the law does not attempt to impose liability for the violation
of a duty unless it constitutes a breach of contract, obligation or
345
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trust or amounts to a deceit, libel or slander; that there was no
privity between the plaintiff and the defendant; that the plaintiff
was but one of the public to whom all news is apt to be dissemi
nated, and that an action by him could be sustained only in
case there was a liability by the defendant to every member of the
community who was misled by the incorrect report. For this the
defendant was held not to be liable.
The Rensselaer Water Company case (Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 1928) was one in which a water company
had failed to supply water to the scene of a fire. There it was
held that such failure was not actionable on the part of property
owners, as there was no duty owing by the water company to
property owners, by contract or by statute.
In arguing on the grounds of equity and expediency, in the
Ultramares case against the claim of negligence, counsel for the
Institute urged that to hold professional men and those conduct
ing a business which, in its nature, is professional work, liable in
negligence to persons other than those either to whom they had
rendered a service or with whom they had come into a direct rela
tionship, and liable to an unlimited number of persons, for an
unlimited amount, perhaps for an unlimited time, would be neither
equitable nor expedient.
On this branch of the case the court of appeals was unanimously
of the opinion that the evidence supported a finding that the
audit made by the defendant was negligently made. In this
connection, it might be added, it was realized by counsel for the
Institute that the greater the negligence shown in this case, the
more striking would be a decision, if obtained, that there was no
liability for negligence in cases of this sort, where privity of con
tract or direct relationship is lacking.
After discussing the various cases cited upon the briefs sub
mitted, the court of appeals stated that the conclusion was in
evitable that nothing in the previous decisions committed them
to a holding of liability for negligence in this case, as such liability,
if recognized, would be an extension of the principle of those
decisions to circumstances which were different, even if more
or less analogous. The opinion of the court then proceeded:
“The question then is whether such an extension should be
made.”
The answer to this question in effect was that if such an exten
sion should be made it would so expand the field of liability for
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negligent speech as to make it nearly, if not quite, coterminous
with that of liability for fraud and that a change so revolutionary,
if expedient, must be wrought by legislation.
The court in its opinion added:
“ If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of de
ceptive entries, may expose accountants to liability in an inde
terminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are
so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist
in the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences
(p. 179).”
Upon the question of negligence, therefore, the judgment of the
appellate division was reversed and the judgment of the trial
court was affirmed, so relieving the accountant defendants from
liability to the plaintiff in negligence, because of the absence of
privity of contract or direct relationship between them. The
court pointed out that “liability for negligence, if adjudged in this
case would extend to many callings other than an auditor’s,” and
that “explanations that might seem plausible, omissions that
might be reasonable, if the duty is confined to the employer, con
ducting a business that presumably at least is not a fraud upon his
creditors, might wear another aspect if an independent duty to be
suspicious, even of one’s principal, is owing to investors.”
The court further pointed out that, in such circumstances,
“everyone making a promise having the quality of a contract
would be under a duty to the promisee by virtue of the promise,
but under another duty apart from contract to an indefinite
number of potential beneficiaries when performance had begun,”
and that, “the assumption of one relation would mean the involun
tary assumption of a series of new relations inescapably hooked
together.” The court said that, while “assault upon the citadel
of privity is proceeding in these days apace,” “the law does not
spread its protection so far.”
To come to such conclusion, of course, the absence of what
might be called direct relationship between the plaintiff and de
fendant was essential. The view of the court was that there was
no liability for negligence on the part of the accountants to an
indeterminate class. If the court had taken a different view of
this part of the case the decision on the first question as to liability
for negligence would certainly have been different. The issuance
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by the accountants of thirty-two copies of the certificate and
possibilities or probabilities of their use did not, evidently, in
opinion of the court, take the place of direct relationship.
slight change in the facts, however, might have brought
plaintiff into a more determinate class, and closer to the
countants, and so might have given a different result.
In this connection Judge Cardozo says, in distinguishing
case of Glanzer v. Shepard:

the
the
A
the
ac
the

“In the case at hand, the service was primarily for the benefit
of the Stern company, a convenient instrumentality for use in the
development of the business, and only incidentally or collaterally
for the use of those to whom Stern and his associates might exhibit
it thereafter. Foresight of these possibilities may charge with
liability for fraud. The conclusion does not follow that it will
charge with liability for negligence (p. 183).”

Without doubt there is a point, which, when reached, will make
accountants liable to the persons who may rely on their state
ments, and for lack of a better term we had called that point—
direct relationship. Judge Cardozo uses the primary purpose of
the transaction as the determining factor in establishing liability,
that is to say “the end and aim of the transaction.”
On page 188 of his opinion, Judge Cardozo illustrates what he
has in mind with reference to the knowledge of the person making
the statement as to the use to which it is to be put, and says in
effect that if accountants are to be liable for negligence in a case
such as the Ultramares case, lawyers who certify their opinion as
to the validity of municipal bonds, knowing that their opinion
will be brought to the notice of the public, will be liable to inves
tors; and title companies insuring titles to land, with knowledge
that their insurance will be stated to the bidders at an approaching
auction, will become liable to purchasers. Judge Cardozo indi
cates that such liability would be an unwarrantable extension of
liability for a negligent misstatement.
The court, however, pointed out that its holding as to negli
gence “does not emancipate accountants from the consequences
of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so
negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in
its adequacy, for this again is fraud.” The court stated that its
holding “does no more than say that if less than this was proved,
if there had been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere
profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the en
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suing liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the con
tract, and is to be enforced between the parties by whom the
contract has been made,” adding that the court doubted
“whether the average business man, receiving a certificate without
paying for it and receiving it merely as one among a multitude of
possible investors, would look for anything more.”
This, then, brought the court to the second cause of action
which was based upon fraud.
The Question

of

Fraud

In order to determine whether or not the accountants in this
case should be held guilty, in the language of the court, either of
reckless misstatement or insincere profession of an opinion and
were not merely guilty of an honest blunder, the facts of the case
which were before the court must be considered by us as they
were by the court.
The facts involve the certificate of the accountants and the
nature of the mistakes made by them.
The certificate of the accountants consists of two sentences.
The first sentence contains statements of fact. The second sen
tence contains a statement of opinion.
A close examination of the opinion of Judge Cardozo will, I
believe, demonstrate that the decision of the court of appeals to
submit to the jury the question of fraud on the part of the
accountants was based chiefly upon the first sentence of the
certificate.
This first sentence reads as follows:
“We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc.,
for the year ended December 31,1923, and hereby certify that the
annexed balance-sheet is in accordance therewith and with the
information and explanations given us.”
This sentence contains the following three statements of
fact:
1. That the accountants had examined the accounts;
2. That the balance-sheet was in accordance with the accounts;
and
3. That the balance-sheet was in accordance with the explana
tions and information given to them.
As to the first statement of fact the court, in its opinion, said
nothing.
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As to the second statement of fact the court said:
“Scienter has been declared to be an indispensable element
except where the representation has been put forward as true of
one’s own knowledge (p. 186). . . .
“The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge,
that the balance sheet was in accordance with the books of ac
count. If this statement was false they are not to be exonerated,
because they believed it to be true. . . . We think the triers of
the facts might hold it to be false (p. 189). ... In this connec
tion we are to bear in mind the principle already stated in the
course of this opinion that negligence or blindness, even when
not equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to sustain an
inference of fraud. At least this is so if negligence is gross
(p. 190).”

From this it is clear that the court considered the statement that
the balance-sheet was in accordance with the accounts as subject
to the inference that it was made by the accountants as of their
own knowledge.
As to the third statement of fact, the court made no particular
comment, but it is evident that the court considered the statement
that the balance-sheet was in accordance with the accounts as
separate from and independent of the statement that the balancesheet was in accordance with the explanations and information
given.
If the statement of the accountants that the balance-sheet was
in accordance with the accounts was unqualified, it must be read
and considered in connection with the errors committed by the
accountants in making the audit.
These errors resulted in a misstatement of net assets of about
$1,000,000 where the gross assets involved were slightly in excess
of $2,550,000. The chief errors were:
1. Including in the total of accounts receivable in the general
ledger, a certain total item of sales posted for December, 1923,
amounting to $706,000, which was fictitious and not supported by
proper sales invoices, this item immediately following another
total item of sales of $644,000 in the same account for the same
month. The circumstances surrounding the entry of the $706,000
item were also otherwise suspicious. Among other things, this
item was entered in a handwriting different from the previous
one of $644,000.
2. Acceptance of an account, entered in the accounts-payable
ledger, which showed on its face a balance of $113,000 receivable,
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instead of a balance payable, as such an account would normally
show.
These two errors were made in the face of certain danger signals
set against the accountants, all of which they disregarded and ran
by. Among others, there were:
1. Discrepancies in reports to the defendants by banks which
indicated that the same accounts receivable had been pledged with
more than one bank;
2. The fact that the inventory, originally furnished to the
defendants, aggregating $347,000, included merchandise, aggre
gating $303,000, which should not have been included and which
was rejected by the accountants.
It was shown in connection with the first error that if the item
of sales of $706,000 had been inquired into it would have been
found that such item had no support in the journal, nor in the
journal vouchers, nor in the debit memo book, which was a sum
mary of the invoices, nor in anything except the invoices them
selves, and that such invoices were not in regular form and were
evidently fictitious.
The court pointed out that the accountants did not say
that they ever looked at the invoices but they did admit,
if they had looked, that they would have found omissions
and irregularities so many and unusual as to call for further
investigation.
The court left it to the jury for decision whether "correspond
ence between the balance-sheets and the books imports some
thing more . . . than correspondence between the balance-sheet
and the ledger, unsupported or even contradicted by every other
record.” In other words, the jury first must determine the fun
damental question whether the statement imports more than
examination of the general ledger. A negative answer to this
question would defeat liability inasmuch as it is conceded that the
general ledger and the audit agreed. An affirmative answer,
however, would not automatically impose liability. In such
circumstances, it would be for the jury to determine whether the
evidence showed that the statement of accountants as to corre
spondence must have been either false or based upon a reckless
disregard of the facts.
The court concludes:
“When we couple the refusal to say that they did look with the
admission that if they had looked, they would or could have seen,
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the situation is revealed as one in which a jury might reasonably
find that in truth they did not look, but certified the correspond
ence without testing its existence (p. 190). ”

It is very clear from the opinion that the court considered that
the statement in the first sentence of the certificate—that the bal
ance-sheet was in accordance with the accounts—might be held
to be false, and that the negligence on the part of the accountants
might be held to be gross. From this follows the conclusion that
the question of fraud for misstatement of fact should be submitted
to the jury for determination.
The second sentence of the certificate reads:
"We further certify, that subject to the provisions of federal
taxes on income, the said statement, in our opinion, presents a
true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern &
Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923.”
The court held that, because of the fact that a jury might find
that the accountants had in the first sentence of the certificate
certified a correspondence between balance-sheet and accounts
that did not exist, and that such statement had been made by
the defendants as true to their own knowledge, it might also be
found by a jury that the same accountants had acted without
information leading to a sincere or genuine belief, when they
certified in the second sentence to an opinion that the balancesheet presented a true and correct view of the actual condition
of the business.
Judge Cardozo had already said:
“Even an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert, may be
found to be fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so flimsy
as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief back
of it (p. 186). ”
The gravamen, however, of the question of fraud lies in the
first sentence of the certificate which constitutes a certification of
a fact as being true to the knowledge of the accountants, which, if
false, whether believed to be true or not, would lay the account
ants open to a charge that the statement was made either with
fraudulent intent or recklessly. In either of these events they
might be held liable for deceit or fraud.
Without the first sentence of the certificate it might well have
been that the court of appeals would not have held that the ques
tion of fraud on the part of the accountants, with reference to the
expression of opinion contained in the second sentence of the
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certificate, should have been submitted to the jury. It is upon
the first sentence particularly that the court hangs its con
clusion.
It must be emphasized that the court did not hold that the
accountants were guilty of fraud but held merely that the evidence
was such that the question of fraud should be submitted to the
jury. The question of fact will always remain as to whether or
not a statement is false and whether or not an opinion professed
is a sincere one. It will always be for the court to decide whether
or not in the testimony there is any evidence which would justify
a submission of these questions, and so the question of fraud, to
the jury.

Two Other Questions
The opinion refers to the practice known as “testing and
sampling” but draws attention to the fact that the accountants
do not assert, in connection with the first error, that any of the
seventeen invoices supporting the fictitious sales were among
the number so selected, and continues:
“Verification by test and sample was very likely a sufficient
audit as to accounts regularly entered upon the books in the usual
course of business. It was plainly insufficient, however, as to
accounts not entered upon the books where inspection of the
invoices was necessary, not as a check upon accounts fair upon
their face, but in order to ascertain whether there were any ac
counts at all. If the only invoices inspected were invoices un
related to the interpolated entry, the result was to certify a
correspondence between the books and the balance sheet without
any effort by the auditors, as to $706,000 of accounts, to ascer
tain whether the certified agreement was in accordance with the
truth. How far books of account fair upon their face are to be
probed by accountants in an effort to ascertain whether the trans
actions back of them are in accordance with the entries, involves
to some extent the exercise of judgment and discretion. Not so,
however, the inquiry whether the entries certified as there, are
there in very truth, there in the form and in the places where men
of business training would expect them to be. The defendants
were put on their guard by the circumstances touching the De
cember accounts receivable to scrutinize with special care. A
jury might find that with suspicions thus awakened, they closed
their eyes to the obvious, and blindly gave assent (p. 192).”
And finally, the court held that the defendants were liable for
acts and omissions of their subordinates to whom they had dele
gated the performance of their work.
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The question remains—What does the Ultramares decision
mean and where does it leave accountants?
As far as negligence is concerned, their liability is just what it
was generally by accountants supposed to be before the Ultra
mares case was begun and what it was generally by accountants
hoped to be just before the court of appeals passed on the case,
namely a liability to those with whom they have been in privity
of contract and to those with whom they have been in direct
relationship.
So far as their liability in fraud is concerned, accountants have
always known that this extended beyond those persons with
whom they might be in privity of contract or direct relationship.
This had been held (Eaton Cole & Burnham Co. v. Avery, 83
N. Y. 31) as early as 1880, and confirmed in later cases, although
there is a limit to this liability even in fraud, as pointed out
by Judge Cardozo, where he says in his opinion in the Ultra
mares case: “A representation, even though knowingly false,
does not constitute ground for an action of deceit unless made
with the intent to be communicated to the person or class of per
sons who act upon it to their prejudice.” It is apparent from the
opinion of Judge Cardozo and from the authorities generally, that
in the case of fraud the class of persons to whom there may be
liability is more extensive than in the case of negligence. The
decision of the court of appeals holds that the plaintiff in the
Ultramares case was in a class of persons who might complain in
fraud, if acting upon a false statement of the defendant. Judge
Cardozo said that charity of construction would not exonerate
accountants from the inference that their representations in
volved a profession of knowledge as distinguished from belief,
inasmuch as by the very nature of their calling they “profess to
speak with knowledge when certifying to an agreement between
the audit and the entries.”
The question that is now chiefly troubling the accountancy
profession is: What is fraud and what does it embrace? The prin
ciples upon which must rest the liability of accountants to stran
gers, as well as to those with whom they may have been in direct
relationship, for fraud or for the equivalent of fraud are not
novel. It would be idle to maintain that accountants should not
be liable for what commonly is termed and known as fraud, that
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is to say, a statement knowingly false, made with the purpose and
intent that it should be acted upon. However, in this country at
least, when a statement is made as of the speaker’s knowledge, it
is the falsity of such statement and not the knowledge that the
statement is false, that is material, otherwise the additional factor
would have to be added, that the statement was made with knowl
edge that it was false. The absence of knowledge of falsity does
not excuse.
For authority for this proposition we must look to other walks
of life, in view of the absence of authority in the United States
connected with accountancy; and in other walks of life the au
thority as to this is perfectly clear.
In an early case in New York (Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238,
1860) the agent of a vendor of land gave a minute description of
the locality and quantity of land which the vendor was selling.
The court held that the minuteness of the description implied
that the vendor himself gave this information as of his own
knowledge. The description was false. This the vendor and the
agent did not know. The court held that the question of fraud
had been fairly submitted to the jury and affirmed the judgment
which held the vendor liable to the purchaser for damages in
fraud.
In a later case (Hadcock v. Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604, 1897) the
defendant made a statement that a man was solvent and would
be able to pay the plaintiff. The man was, in fact, insolvent and
unable to pay. The plaintiff recovered in fraud, although it was
not shown that the defendant knew of the insolvency.
In a still more recent case {Ottinger v. Bennett, 144 app. div.
525, containing the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Miller on
which the court of appeals based its decision, 203 N. Y. 554, 1911)
the court held that if a dividend were declared out of capital,
when there was a statute that dividends could be declared only
out of surplus, such action might be held to be a fraudulent state
ment on the part of the directors. The court further held in effect
that such action might be considered equivalent to a reckless
statement made without knowledge. There the relationship
was not close.
Untrue statements in a prospectus concerning mining stock,
although believed by the president of the company issuing the
prospectus to be true, have been held to be the basis of a recovery
in fraud, because the defendant made the statements of his own
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knowledge (Bystrom v. Villard, 175 app. div. 433, N. Y. 1916).
There also the relationship was not close.
A plaintiff (Archibald & Lewis Co. v. Banque Intern, de Com
merce. 216 app. div. 322, N. Y. 1926) wired a defendant bank
asking whether certain collateral had been forwarded. The bank
made reasonable inquiries and wired that the collateral had been
sent. This was untrue, and, on being unable to collect on the
note, the plaintiff was allowed to recover from the bank for
fraudulent misrepresentations, inasmuch as the bank had made
the statement as of its own knowledge.
A promoter of a corporation {Owens v. Waterhouse, 225 app.
div. 582, N. Y. 1929) was held liable to a plaintiff for statements
concerning the corporation which were untrue, although the
promoter may have believed them to be true at the time he made
them.
A close analogy to such liability for fraud of the character here
discussed is found in the statutory provision that wanton conduct
may take the place of specific intent even in first degree murder
(Sec. 1044 penal law of the consolidated laws of New York,
1909). The provision reads as follows:
“The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifi
able, is murder in the first degree, when committed: . . .
(2) By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a
depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without a
premeditated design to effect the death of any individual.”
This statute was based upon the common law which it was in
tended to clarify. Thus, a man firing a pistol into a house in
which he knew there were people, with no intent to kill, but taking
no precaution against killing, has been held guilty of first degree
murder, although ordinarily a specific intent is necessary (People
v. Jernatowski, 238 N. Y. 188, 1924).
So we see that an accountant’s liability for fraud as stated by
Judge Cardozo in his opinion is not different from the liability in
other cases imposed upon vendors of land, presidents and directors
of corporations, banks, promoters, and ordinary individuals in
ordinary walks of life.
It should be remembered, therefore, that a statement made by
an accountant as a fact true to his own knowledge, and not merely
as an opinion, will subject him to an action for fraud where such an
action might hot lie if the form of certificate did not contain such
a statement of fact, and so did not leave the accountant open to
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attack on the ground of the falsity of his statement. For an
opinion to form the basis of a claim for fraud, the opinion, as
Judge Cardozo said, must have been flimsy and recklessly given
or without sincere or genuine belief.
Practical Aspects of the Ultramares Case
Accountants perhaps fear that they may be held guilty of
fraud by some judge or jury if they have omitted or have done
imperfectly one of the numerous things that they might do, but
all of which, as a practical matter, it is impossible for them to do
in any one audit. This is true, but it is no more true of ac
countants than of all business men, and no more true of fraud
than it always has been of negligence.
Accountants, however, should not fear that courts or juries will
be unreasonable in their application to their business of the princi
ples which I have been discussing. As an indication of this,
read the opinion of Judge Kellogg in the Fulton Trust Company
case (In the Matter of Fulton Trust Co., decided July 15, 1931,
by the New York court of appeals, as yet unreported). The sur
rogate had surcharged the trust company, as trustee under a will,
for failure to sell certain securities belonging to the deceased,
which it was authorized by the will to retain, but they had been
retained to the great loss of the trust, due to a constant decline in
the market price of the securities. There was evidence showing
that the trustee had considered the matter; that it was not careless.
Judge Kellogg states: “ The distinction between negligence and mere
error of judgment must be borne in mind. ” The opinion concludes :
“Under the circumstances, we think that the trustee, as the
event has proven, was guilty, at the very most, of an error of judg
ment, in not making sale of the stocks at an earlier date. It may
have been deficient in prevision and prophecy; it was not lacking
in the exercise of care.”
The decision of the surrogate was reversed.
This case shows that the court of appeals is not unmindful
of the possibilities and practical aspects of a situation and will
not harshly impose liability.
Then, also, much might be done with the form of the account
ant’s certificate. Why not confine the statements of fact in the
certificate to those things which can be stated as facts, if there are
any, and give opinion as to what is susceptible only of opinion ?
If this had been done in the Ultramares certificate the main
hook upon which Judge Cardozo hung his opinion would have
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been lacking. Persons should not make statements without
knowing that they are true—especially professional men. The
professional man necessarily, when he deals in opinions, is exempt
from certain responsibilities but is still held to others. He may
reasonably be expected to have average or fair competency in his
calling and to be held responsible for gross negligence and for gross
incompetency.
If an accountant states that books and accounts are correct,
without knowing that the books and accounts are correct, he is
acting in disregard of the rights of others and in disregard of his
duty to the public as well as to his employer. In this same cate
gory might well be placed a statement of opinion where in fact
there was no opinion—at least, no opinion which could be con
sidered as an expression of a state of mind arrived at after proper
consideration had been given to the subject involved.
With the increasing complexity of business and of the methods
of handling business, there is an increasing need for authoritative
data and accurate statements. As the average man knows per
sonally less about his own business or the business in which he
may be interested than he did before, he is in need of being told
even more than before. This is the opportunity of the account
ant. But, as there is, on the one hand, a more general and wide
spread demand and need for information concerning the financial
condition of business of corporations, caused, among other things,
by the increased investment in their securities on the part of the
public, so there is, on the other hand, an increasing danger and
difficulty, so far as accountancy is concerned, in examining the
condition of such corporations and in reporting upon them. The
increase of demand and opportunity bears with it an increase of
responsibility. They go hand in hand. The accountant who is
able to meet this situation and give service which can be relied
upon will reap his reward.
Conclusion
The chief contention of the accountancy profession in this case
was that an accountant should not be held liable for negligence to
a stranger but only to a person with whom he has come into direct
relationship. This contention was sustained. An accountant’s
liability for fraud, like that of everyone else, has never been limited
to those with whom he may be in contractual or direct relationship.
To give out a false statement, to make a statement or give an
opinion without any foundation whatsoever to support it, to be
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guilty of gross negligence have generally been held to be evidence
of fraud. A judge in the first instance and a jury finally must
pass on the facts to determine whether such facts come within
the boundaries of these principles. This is as far as Judge Car
dozo’s opinion goes.
As to the uncertainty regarding what may or may not consti
tute fraud—it is impossible for the court to say that certain con
duct and only certain conduct will make an accountant liable for
fraud or even for negligence. The breadth of the rule must be
increased as the breadth of the violation increases so as to
embrace the violation. The vast and expanding nature of an ac
countant’s business does, it is true, make this matter more vital
and more serious for him than for men engaged in many other
lines of business.
As it is impossible for the court to set down definite rules with
regard to what facts shall constitute fraud and what facts shall not
come within the definition of fraud, it is, of course, also impossi
ble for the legislature to define fraud explicitly. The ingenuity of
laymen, if not of lawyers, would circumvent any such definition.
The rule of reason must govern in such cases.
In this connection it might be remarked that what in the past
might not have been considered to be reckless or to constitute
negligence, today might well come within a reasonable definition
of such words. Accountants as well as lawyers, doctors and other
professional men must expect to be held to a stricter account of
their professional ability, as the factors with which they deal
become more intricate. It is reasonable to anticipate that the
spread of knowledge and what might be called civilization will
certainly increase the liability of everyone. Each addition to
the realm of knowledge increases responsibility. Each complica
tion of civilization complicates with it the rights and duties of men
towards one another. Every privilege which is gained carries
with it a complementary responsibility. No one driving an
automobile along a crowded thoroughfare can be ignorant of this,
and if he should claim to be, the claim will do him little good
when the sentence of fine or imprisonment is about to be imposed.
And as we can not tell how knowledge and culture may expand,
so we can not tell how liability and responsibility will expand along
with them. This, of course, may be unsatisfactory to accountants
and to others, but it is a reality, taught by history and experience.
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